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This project focuses on the ultimatum game—an experiment done by many economists to 
determine levels of altruism, fairness, equality, and financial responsibility individuals possess. It 
involves two players bargaining over a sum of money and is often used as a proxy for how 
people manage their income, negotiate for salaries, or think about fairness. Many identities have 
been tested, such as age, race, and gender, and while differences have been found based on 
gender, nobody has controlled the study for sexuality. The goal of this study was to determine 
whether sexuality has an impact on the results of the ultimatum game specifically by comparing 
gay and straight men. A total of 18 gay men and 30 straight men participated in this game. I 
analyzed the means of each group’s data points using t-tests and ran two regressions with 
variables collected in the demographic survey; ultimately, there was little difference in offers 
made or minimum acceptance thresholds based on sexuality. Therefore, it is impossible to reject 
the hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the way in which straight and gay 
males play the ultimatum game. The results suggest that gay and straight men do not act 
differently when given the prompts of this game, thus they may make similar financial decisions 
and bargaining choices. 
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Sexual orientation has an impact on the way in which individuals experience the world around 
them, participate in an economic system, and interact with others in the marketplace. Many 
people have studied the way in which gender effects economic assumptions and decisions 
(Hoddinott, Kenney, Solnick, etc), though very few have considered the sexual orientation of the 
individuals in the study. While understanding gender certainly provides a valuable window into 
how identities can influence actions, studying gender alone could lead to generalizations about 
roles and behaviors that do not control for the differing sexual orientations or family structures of 
individuals. 
 The motivation for this project ultimately stems from the simple question: Are gay men 
more, less, or similarly altruistic when compared to their straight peers, and under what 
circumstances? Do gay men have any particular experiences that may make them more likely to 
empathize with other people in general or with other gay men? There may exist a so-called 
“solidarity complex” among people who have similar life experiences, thus causing them to feel 
more altruistic towards others in the same position. For example, this could involve employers 
offering higher salaries to people who they feel are struggling to make ends meet for a similar 
reason to them. So perhaps gay males who are bargaining with other potential gay males might 
act differently than their straight peers. 
There are many ways to study this, though one practical way for an undergraduate project 
was through a proxy study using an economic experiment known as the ultimatum game. In the 
ultimatum game, Player A is given a set amount of money and told to divide it between Players 
A and B however he or she sees fit. Player B can either accept the offer Player A has made, or 
reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, both players receive the allocations of money that Player 
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A decided on; in the case of a rejection, both players get nothing. All players know all the rules 
and possible outcomes before the game begins, so there is no inconsistency in information, and 
no surprises. People who believe that actors always make rational decisions would expect Player 
B to accept any offer, because getting something from the game is better than getting nothing—
however this does not always play out in practice. 
Many studies on the ultimatum game actually find that people are often more generous 
than researchers expect, and make offers above what they indicate as their own minimum 
willingness to accept. Stanton and Ahmadi discuss this from a neurological standpoint in which 
they discuss some of the implications of altruism and its impact on generosity specifically in the 
ultimatum game. They conclude that for individuals who are forced to consider the reactions of 
their partners, generosity increases, and predictions about self-interested actors break down. 
 According to prior research on this game, there is little difference in offers made by men 
versus women (Solnick). However, men tend to receive higher offers than women, and people of 
both genders tend to expect higher offers from women (Solnick). Studying gay men would help 
answer important questions, such as:  
 On the offering end, would gay men make higher offers than straight men, perhaps because 
they are more acutely aware of economic discrimination? Or would they be less willing to 
forfeit a chance to earn money?  
 On the receiving end, would they recognize an opportunity to receive a financial award, no 
matter how small, and be willing to accept lower offers than straight men? Or would they 
expect more altruism and fairness from Player 1 and only accept more equitable offers? 
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 Are gay men more altruistic, trusting, and proficient with income distribution than their 
heterosexual peers?  
 Do gay men conform to the image of the “Economic Man” more, less, or the same as 
straight men?  
 What could be the causes of these differences in perspective? 
 This study would help us learn whether there are noticeable differences in the way in 
which gay men participate in the economy and whether they are representative of the “rational 
economic man” that is so widely accepted as the backbone for economic models. From these 
potential differences or similarities it could be possible to make inferences about how gay men 




There is substantial economic research to suggest that men and women allocate their incomes 
differently. This is critical to understand when doing research in this field; if we know that men 
and women tend to have different expenditure patterns, then it is reasonable to assume that they 
will act differently in the marketplace and therefore may act differently in the ultimatum game. 
In particular, several studies show that when women control a greater share of the household 
income, children benefit in a variety of ways. 
 Phipps and Burton studied the influence of male and female incomes on expenditure 
patterns using data from Canada. Men and women seem to have different responsibilities for 
spending their income, which reinforces the importance that gender roles play in society. Women 
were more likely to be the ones “responsible” for purchasing goods for children, for example. 
The study also found that men and women tend to spend their own income on private goods that 
are for themselves, meaning each person in the relationship is likely to purchase small-ticket 
items using their own income. This again reinforces the idea that men and women often control 
their own incomes separately (except for big-ticket items like mortgages, where couples often 
“pool” their incomes). The study is careful to survey only families with full-time, full-year 
working parents. 
 Looking at food insecurity as a specific impact of income allocation, Kenny finds that 
when women control most of the income, young children are less likely to experience food 
insecurity, while in families where the father controls a chunk of the income, food insecurity for 
children rises. The article reinforces the pull of the American nuclear family norms which dictate 
that women are responsible for feeding children. These findings are also consistent with evidence 
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from Côte d’Ivoire (Hoddinott and Haddad) which suggests that there is a correlation between 
the identity of a wage earner and his or her consumption patterns. Interestingly enough, this 
study looks at both heterosexual couples and also single parent households. The evidence here 
suggests that raising a woman’s income increases the share of food budget and decreases the 
share of budget designated for tobacco and alcohol. 
 Many of these studies are done in developing nations, and several more from Africa help 
solidify the point. Blumberg shows using data from various countries in Africa that women are 
more likely to be altruistic with their income rather than selfish, spending income on “basic 
human needs” for the family. Losses in women’s income can be devastating for food production 
and consumption, for example. There are further implications of this study: women who have 
more economic control have more decision making control in the household. If men are typically 
the more selfish of the sexes, then it would be interesting to learn whether gay men follow in the 
same steps as their straight peers. Determining whether gay men are more, equally, or less selfish 
than typical males will have implications for household income expenditures. 
 More evidence of gender roles and bargaining arises in households with more than two 
adults. Gummerson and Schneider look at bargaining patterns over how to spend and distribute 
income, finding that bargaining for resource allocation tends to happen in groups that are based 
on gender, meaning women often have the same ideas as other women about how to spend 
money, while men have ideas that are different from women but similar to other men. 
Additionally, as more adults were added to the household, women’s bargaining power over the 
family’s money is lowered. The fact that bargaining tends to happen in gendered groups could 
provide some insight into how same-sex couples choose to allocate their incomes, since same-
sex couples are by definition the same gender. 
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 Sara Solnick has done significant work regarding the ultimatum game, and how gender, 
physical appearance, and other things affect how the game is played. In one study (2001), she 
showed that men tend to attract higher monetary offers in the game, particularly from women. 
Additionally, people of both genders expected higher offers from women making offers rather 
than men. Further study in 2008 using gender controls in the Investment Game showed that 
women are more trustworthy than men—which could possibly be related to the fact that women 
are more likely to be responsible with their incomes. However, men tended to trust more than 
women did, perhaps because they expected a higher return on their investment—this is related to 
the previous study suggesting that men attract higher offers in the ultimatum game. Another 
ultimatum game study by Solnick and Schweitzer suggests that there is a premium for being 
attractive or being a male: Both men and attractive people were offered more. However, more 
was demanded of attractive people while less was demanded of men. These results may have 
bargaining implications, for salary negotiations and setting household budgets. 
 There are also evolutionary explanations for why men and women play these types of 
games differently. Saad and Gill find differences in offers men and women make (unlike 
Solnick’s study which shows only major differences in Player B’s behavior). Men tended to 
make higher offers to women than to men, which they suggest may be because men are 
accustomed to having to compete with other men for mates—so they offer more to women while 
being more competitive with their male peers. Gay men are arguably less occupied with 
impressing females, and my study will have Player B be anonymous, so it would be interesting to 
see whether this affects how they make offers to Player B. Additionally, Eckel and Grossman 
find that in a double anonymous dictator game (similar to the ultimatum game), women offered 
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twice as much on average as men did, suggesting their commitment to altruism and selflessness. 





The majority of research for this study was centered on performing the ultimatum game with 
groups of individuals recruited for the study. Individuals were recruited by advertisement in the 
community and on campus, using pull-tab fliers in the student center and academic buildings, 
outreach in classes with large numbers of students, and several emails to appropriate mailing 
lists. Recruitment was also done by word of mouth and referrals from participants. Special 
attention was given to using resources to locate self-identifying gay men for the study. I used the 
UVM LGBTQA Center and the VT Pride Center for their resources, mostly for their email 
contacts and for reaching out to groups that meet in these locations. 
 When the participants were recruited for the project, they were told that the researchers 
were seeking “self-identifying gay or straight males who were at least 18 years old.” The fliers 
indicated that the game was a study on decision making, and if asked for further clarification, 
participants were told that the researcher was looking to study how different people make 
decisions and what kinds of responses they would have to some prompts. These prompts 
involved playing a short game, on paper, in which players would be paired with another 
participant that they would not have the chance to meet. The recruitment flier and a sample email 
that was sent out to email lists can be seen in Appendix A: Recruitment. 
Participation in the game was confidential, the privacy of the participants was protected, 
and compliance with all Institutional Review Board (IRB) regulations was addressed. 
Participants were paid for their involvement in the study, so as to give the players a real stake in 
the game. Each participant was given a $5 Ben & Jerry’s ice cream gift card just for showing up, 
and then participants were paid based on their outcomes in one of their two games. A random 
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number generator in Google spreadsheets was used to determine which of the two games they 
would be paid for; this involved using a formula to assign each of the two games a random 
number between 0 and 1, allowing the researchers to randomize which room was the Player “A” 
room and which was the Player “B” room. In total, seven sessions were held in February and 
March of 2017. 
 When participants arrived at the research site, a greeter checked them in and gave them a 
slip of paper with a code that they would use for identification on relevant forms, such as the 
game sheets and the demographic surveys. The greeter arbitrarily divided participants among 
two separate rooms, one proctored by the researcher and one by his adviser, in an attempt to keep 
approximately equal numbers of participants in each room. (In the event of an odd number, one 
player in the smaller room was assigned two partners; this player did not know he was paired 
with two participants, but out of courtesy, he was paid based on whichever pairing earned the 
highest returns.) The purpose of the two rooms was so that players could be paired with someone 
in another room without knowing who that person was. 
Once it was determined that all participants consented to the study, the researchers read 
instructions, gave examples, and checked players’ understanding with a short “quiz” containing 
possible allocations of money. These instructions and the quiz can be seen in Appendix B: 
Participant Materials. There were multiple opportunities to ask questions during instruction.  
In order to play the game, Player A was given $10 and told to divide it between Players A 
and B however he saw fit, but using only whole numbers. Player B could either accept the offer 
Player A had made, or reject the offer. If the offer was accepted, both players received the 
allocations of money that Player A had decided on; in the case of a rejection, both players got 
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nothing. All players knew all the rules and possible outcomes before the game begins, so there 
was no inconsistency in information, and no surprises. Each pair effectively played two games, 
because each participant had a chance to be Player A and Player B. 
To play as Player A, participants used a pre-printed game sheet to select an allocation 
from a list of all the possible allocations; this produced the data point referred to as the “offer.” 
An example would be offering $4 to your opponent and keeping $6 for yourself. To play as 
Player B, participants recorded on that same game sheet a decision for whether or not they would 
accept each of the possible offers that Player A could have made. This generally
1
 produced a 
data point called the “minimum acceptance threshold” (referred to in this paper as the 
“minimum”, for short); this was the minimum offer that Player B would be willing to accept out 
of all the possible offers. An example of this might be indicating that you would accept any offer 
of $3 or higher but reject any offer of $2 or lower, thus the “minimum” would be $3. 
After being given these instructions on how to play the game, participants recorded both 
their offers (for when they were Player A) and the minimum amount they would accept (for 
when they were Player B). Participants filled out the sheet for both players at the same time. The 
sheet that participants used can be seen in Appendix B. 
In order to calculate results, the researchers used a Google spreadsheet, which allowed 
for simultaneous editing and data transfer without leaving the separate rooms. Meanwhile, the 
participants answered a questionnaire, which contained a space to identify gender and sexuality, 
as well as other demographic factors (the exact survey can be found in Appendix B). The 
outcome of each participant’s game was shared individually using the code sheets. After this, 
                                                          
1
 Two players also had a “maximum acceptance threshold,” meaning they indicated they would also reject certain 
offers that they deemed to be too high. Neither of the players were offered a high enough amount for this maximum 
to make a difference in their payouts. 
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participants were free to leave the study and receive payment from the greeter they met on the 
way in. The sessions averaged approximately 30 minutes in duration and the average payout 
from the game was $5 in cash, plus a $5 gift card for showing up. 
To analyze the results, I used Microsoft Excel to calculate basic demographics from the 
study (number of participants and their responses to the demographic survey), as well as the 
averages and standard deviations for each category of people. I used Gretl regression software to 
run t-tests and regressions for the data. I used the t-tests to determine whether or not there was a 
significant difference between the data points for gay and straight men, and a regression to 
determine whether the independent variable of sexuality had an influence on the dependent 




The first thing to note about this study is that the participants were relatively homogeneous, 
owing largely to the population sample that was available in the area. A total of 49 individuals 
participated in the study over the course of the sessions, however not every participant could be 
counted in the results. One individual indicated on the demographic survey a gender other than 
male and by coincidence also happened to not follow instructions properly on the game sheet; 
this data point was eliminated. Additionally, there were 4 participants who did not identify as 
either gay or straight; however the decision was made to group these participants with those who 
identified as gay, given that the purpose of the study broadly was to compare straight males to 
non-straight males. The tables for these results can all be found in the Tables section. 
This brought the number of valid entries to 48, which can be seen in Table 1. Of these 
48, 18 identified as gay and 30 identified as straight. In terms of other demographics, 96% of the 
participants had completed at least some college, and 92% identified white as their race; 56% 
were between the ages of 18-21. Additionally, 81% of the participants identified as either 
somewhat liberal or liberal on a question regarding general political leanings. 
 In the game, each player had the opportunity to play as two players, A and B. Player A 
was the one who made the offer and Player B was the one who chose whether or not to accept 
that offer. Thus there were two critical data points for each participant: when playing as Player 
A, the important figure was the amount they offered to Player B (“Offer”), and when playing as 
B, the important figure was the minimum offer they would be willing to accept from Player A 
(“Minimum”). The mean and standard deviation for each data point for each group of 
participants is shown in Table 2. Two participants in the game offered more than $5 to their 
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opponent, and both were straight, white males; nobody had a minimum acceptance of more than 
$5.  
There was very little difference in both offers and minimums based on sexuality. Straight 
males offered a mean of $4.72 while gay males offered a mean of $4.56, suggesting that straight 
males were slightly more generous on average. For minimums, straight males accepted a mean 
minimum of $3.00 while gay males accepted a mean minimum of $2.83, suggesting that either 
straight males demanded a comparably higher offer, or that gay males were willing to accept a 
comparatively lower offer, depending on your interpretation. The only interesting statistic from 
the standard deviations is that gay males’ offers were the most concentrated of nearly any group 
in the study—the standard deviation was 1.042. 
In Tables 3 and 4, you can see the results of the t-tests for both offers and minimums 
based on the control of sexuality. This test was to determine whether there was a significant 
difference between the means of the data for straight and gay men. For both cases, the following 
hypotheses were used: 
H0: Difference of means = 0 
H1: Difference of means ≠ 0. 
So in order to reject the null hypothesis of no difference, there would have to be a statistically 
significant difference between the mean offers (or minimums) of gay and straight men. For both 
cases, at the 95% confidence interval, the test statistic was not high enough to reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference in the offers and minimums for gay males and straight males. 
On balance, the highest offers came from younger people, with participants aged 18-21 
offering a mean of $4.81. The next highest means were whites ($4.77) and liberals ($4.74). 
Conversely, the lowest offers came from non-whites ($3.50), moderates and conservatives 
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($4.33), and those aged 21 and up ($4.48). As for the minimums, younger people and those with 
more than a college degree were willing to accept the lowest offers ($2.74 and $2.75 
respectively), while those with less than a college degree and non-whites demanded the highest 
offers ($4.50 and $3.25 respectively). 
In order to determine whether the independent variable of sexuality had an impact on the 
dependent variables of the offer and minimum, I ran a regression using the ordinary least squares 
model. For the variables, I continued to divide age into groups of ≤21 and >21, and continued to 
use the liberal and conservative/moderate binary. The results can be seen in Table 5. Neither of 
these regressions show any significant findings, meaning that none of the variables had a 
statistically significant impact on the offer or minimum. Therefore, given the data from this 
study, it is impossible to reject the original hypothesis that there is no difference between how 




Same-sex households are a growing dynamic entering American culture, deviating from 
generations of norms and standards for how a typical family should operate. For some, it is 
challenging to understand how the two male or two female parent dynamic plays out at home, 
and with only very limited data and studies (same-sex marriages and unions have only been well 
documented for two decades at best) this is at the forefront of economic, sociological, and gender 
studies research. Research suggesting that men aren’t as proficient at performing child-rearing 
tasks as women has long been a cloud looming over the LGBTQ community. 
This particular study showed no significant difference between the offers and minimums 
of gay and straight men in the ultimatum game. So since gay men and straight men show no 
difference in how they respond to prompts in the ultimatum game, it is possible that gay men 
view finances, money, and fairness similarly to straight men, and that their levels of altruism are 
not noticeably higher than straight men. This study is unable to say that gay men would make 
different decisions than that their straight peers, or that they think about the economic world 
differently, since we see no difference in the results of the game. Certainly this game is not the 
only way to judge how individuals will manage their financial lives—but it provides valuable 
insight. 
If it were possible to redo this study over again, there are some aspects I would change to 
make it more effective and make it run more smoothly. First of all, as I have mentioned, the 
sample size for this study was small and homogeneous; with more time and funding, it would 
have been possible to expand recruitment efforts in a few ways. First of all, I would have reached 
beyond the immediate area surrounding UVM’s campus for participants. There was a lack of 
participants who were outside the typical college age and demographics. Visiting community 
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sites in Burlington and surrounding towns would allow for older participants and a greater 
variety of racial backgrounds. (Race in particular was challenging because the area is 
predominantly white.) 
Additionally, despite all best efforts to make very simple and easy to understand 
instructions and materials, the instructors still encountered questions from participants about how 
the game works and received game sheets that were either incomplete or filled out incorrectly. I 
was able to have one practice session prior to holding the first real session, but there were only 
four people present. It would have been useful to hold additional practice sessions to get 
comfortable with the kinds of questions people ask and make sure the real sessions ran smoothly. 
On a more technical note, there is a question in the demographic survey (which can be 
seen in Appendix B) that at least one participant found to be limiting, and I as a researcher found 
to be ineffective also. When asking participants about political leanings, the scale I used required 
participants to indicate beliefs on a strictly liberal—conservative scale. It would have been 
interesting to ask two separate questions in place of the single question: One that asks 
participants to consider “economic issues” and one that asks participants to consider “social 
issues.” I feel that the responses to the single question do not allow for enough nuances in 
people’s beliefs; one participant who felt strongly about this sentiment even wrote at the bottom 
of the page: “That [circle] is so you have a data point, but liberal vs. conservative doesn’t capture 
the political spectrum well. I am very liberal on social issues and moderately conservative on 
fiscal issues.” 
It is my hope that in the future, students and academics alike will consider further 
research in this important and developing intersection of disciplines. A study such as this one 
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could be replicated on a much larger and more demographically diverse sample if given more 
time and funding. Additional findings across multiple studies would be useful because they 
would either confirm or challenge the results I have found here. Additionally there are numerous 
ways in which this research could be expanded to capture new circumstances. 
Including women in the study eventually would be important, given that my initial 
interest in this area of study came about due to noticeable gender differences both in how the 
game is played and in how men and women view altruism. I initially wanted to study four groups 
of participants: gay males, straight males, gay women, and straight women. But due to funding 
constraints, it was determined that using just two categories would allow for a larger n-size in 
each category. 
Similar work should also be done in different geographic areas. Since a large number of 
the participants were college students, there may have been some geographic diversity built into 
the study—I chose not to ask the home state or region of participants. But it is entirely possible 
that gay and straight men in different regions of the country may think about the game 
differently. There are more liberal and more conservative areas of the country, variations in the 
perception of gay males as a group, and certainly a wide range of socioeconomic statuses 
impacting different parts of the country. Each of these could impact the decisions that people 
make in their offers and willingness to accept. 
Researchers know that the amount of money at stake has an effect on how the ultimatum 
game is played—the most significant finding is that as the amount to bargain over increases, 
rejection rates tend to decrease, though it isn’t as clear how the offers change. While $10 is 
enough money to provide a reasonable stake in the game for participants (and is affordable for 
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the researchers), a game in which $100 was at stake would provide even more information about 
altruism. Specifically: If Player A estimates that his or her partner is likely to accept the offer, 
how generous will they be willing to be?  
There are also opportunities to play games that are face-to-face rather than anonymous. I 
chose to design my game with anonymous partners because it would be easier to get participants 
to consent to games in which they would not have to interact with another person, and I felt it 
would be difficult to control for the various effects of being able to see your partner. However, it 
would be interesting to play games in which players reveal their sexual orientation to their 
partners (or where each player is told the sexual orientation of his or her partner). This could test 
assumptions of how people expect others to play. 
Finally, there is another game similar to the ultimatum game that should be considered: 
the dictator game. Player A’s role is virtually identical, but Player B’s role is almost nonexistent; 
in the dictator game, Player B doesn’t have the chance to choose whether to accept or reject the 
offer. The offer automatically stands as Player A decided. This game is a pure test of altruism, 
but does not allow for the bargaining and two-step nature that is seen in the ultimatum game.  
It would also be interesting to ask subjective questions such as why the participants chose 
and accepted the particular allocations they did. In speaking with some participants post data 
collection, I heard many comments from people wondering why everyone didn’t just offer an 
equal payment to their partner. These kinds of remarks signal an expectation of equality and 
fairness among my sample that traditional economics does not often account for. As mentioned 
earlier, the rational choice for Player A would be to offer only a small amount, and the rational 
choice for B would be to accept any offer (because presumably something is better than nothing). 
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As more and more families fall outside the traditional American family and different 
sexual orientations become accepted in the mainstream, it will be important to examine the 
impact this will have on the economy, in everything from investment into children, to bargaining 
for wages, to ideas about fairness and equality. This study is not a conclusion, but merely opens 





Category Identity Number Percentage 
Sexuality Straight 30 63% 
  Not straight 18 38% 
Race White 44 92% 
  Non-white 4 8% 
 Age 18-21 27 56% 
  >21 21 44% 
Education Less than college 2 4% 
  Some college 38 79% 
  More than some college 8 17% 
Political Liberal 39 81% 
  Moderate or conservative 9 19% 
Total All 48 100% 
 
Table 2 








Sexuality Straight $4.72 1.552 $3.00 1.722 
  Not straight $4.56 1.042 $2.83 1.689 
Race White $4.77 1.292 $2.91 1.668 
 Non-white $3.50 1.915 $3.25 2.217 
 Age 18-21 $4.81 1.241 $2.74 1.767 
  >21 $4.48 1.537 $3.19 1.601 
Education Less than college $4.50 0.500 $4.50 0.500 
 Some college $4.71 1.137 $2.89 1.689 
 More than some college $4.50 2.236 $2.75 1.714 
Political Liberal $4.74 1.428 $2.92 1.707 
  Moderate or 
conservative 
$4.33 1.118 $3.00 1.732 







Null hypothesis: Difference of means = 0 
 
Sample 1: Straight 
 n = 30, mean = 4.73333, s.d. = 1.55216 
 standard error of mean = 0.283384 
 95% confidence interval for mean: 4.15375 to 5.31292 
 
 
Sample 2: Gay 
 n = 18, mean = 4.55556, s.d. = 1.04162 
 standard error of mean = 0.245512 
 95% confidence interval for mean: 4.03757 to 5.07354 
 
 
Test statistic: t(46) = (4.73333 - 4.55556)/0.413097 = 0.430353 
Two-tailed p-value = 0.6689 





Null hypothesis: Difference of means = 0 
 
Sample 1: Straight 
 n = 30, mean = 3, s.d. = 1.72207 
 standard error of mean = 0.314405 
 95% confidence interval for mean: 2.35697 to 3.64303 
 
 
Sample 2: Gay 
 n = 18, mean = 2.83333, s.d. = 1.68907 
 standard error of mean = 0.398116 
 95% confidence interval for mean: 1.99338 to 3.67329 
 
 
Test statistic: t(46) = (3 - 2.83333)/0.509807 = 0.326921 
Two-tailed p-value = 0.7452 






Ordinary Least Squares, using observations 1—48 
Model 1: Offer 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio p-value Significance 
       
Constant  4.93502 0.357526 13.8032 <0.0001 *** 
Sexuality 0: Straight 
1: Gay 
−0.0762684 0.337017 −0.2263 0.8220 
 
Race 0: White 
1: Non-white 
−1.17739 0.846246 −1.3913 0.1713 
 
Age 0: ≤21 
1: >21 
−0.183872 0.399837 −0.4599 0.6479 
 
Politics 0:  Liberal 
1: Moderate/ 
Conservative 
−0.326339 0.399492 −0.8169 0.4185 
 
Model 2: Minimum 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio p-value Significance 
       
Constant  2.79502 0.416157 6.7162 <0.0001 *** 
Sexuality 0: Straight 
1: Gay 
−0.188268 0.529762 −0.3554 0.7240 
 
Race 0: White 
1: Non-white 
0.218607 1.06933 0.2044 0.8390 
 
Age 0: ≤21 
1: >21 
0.424128 0.50462 0.8405 0.4053 
 
Politics 0: Liberal 
1: Moderate/ 
Conservative 






Appendix A: Recruitment 
Are you a straight male or gay male interested in 
supporting student research at UVM? 
 
I am seeking self-identifying straight or gay men for a study on decision making. 
Participants will: 
 Play a game and answer a short demographic survey 
 Receive a Ben & Jerry’s gift card and possible cash rewards 
 Be finished in less than one hour 
Please contact Nick DeMassi to sign up or to ask further questions! 
 
 
Nick DeMassi, Economics Student at the University of Vermont 
























































































































































































































Subject Line: Seeking participants for a research project on decision making 
Hello everyone! 
My name is Nicholas DeMassi, I am an economics student at the University of Vermont and I 
am seeking participants for my thesis research. In particular, I am looking to recruit self-
identifying straight and gay men for a decision making study that involves playing a game and 
taking a short demographic survey. 
Participation will involve compensation for your time. Playing the game does not involve 
interaction with other participants; however you will be in the same room as other participants. 
Your name and sexual orientation will not be known to other participants and will only be used 
by the researchers. 
If you are interested in being a participant in this study or if you have further questions, please 
contact me at 774-254-1045 (phone call or text) or ndemassi@uvm.edu. Thank you very much 








Appendix B: Participant Materials 
First, let’s learn how to play the game 
 
1. There are two players: Player A and Player B. 
2. Player A is given a sum of money and told to divide the money between 
Player A and Player B, using only whole numbers. 
3. Player B then has the option to either accept the offer or reject it. 
 If Player B accepts the offer, Player A and Player B each receive the 
payouts that Player A offered. 
 If Player B rejects the offer, both players receive nothing. 
 
Here are a couple of examples 
 Suppose Player A is given $6: 
o Player A offers $4 to himself, and $2 to Player B. 
o Player B accepts the offer, so he gets $2 and Player A gets $4. 
 Suppose Player A is given $9: 
o Player A offers $5 to herself and $4 to Player B. 




Let’s check your understanding of how the game works with a couple of questions 
 
1. Suppose Player A is given $7. Which of the following divisions would it be 
possible for Player A to make? (Circle all that apply): 
a. $6 for Player A and $2 for Player B 
b. $7 for Player A and $0 for Player B 
c. $3 for Player A and $4 for Player B 
d. $3 for Player A and $2 for Player B 
 
2. If Player A chooses to offer Player B $3, and keep $4 for herself, what are 
the options for Player B? (Circle all that apply): 
a. Accept the offer and receive $3 
b. Accept the offer and receive $0 
c. Reject the offer and receive $3 




When you play the game, you will first play as Player A and then you will play as 
Player B.  
When you play as Player B, rather than viewing the offer from Player A, you will 
instead make a decision for every possible offer—the researchers will match your 




It’s Time to Play the Game! 
Decision: Player A 
 
 
Decision: Player B 
Allocation 
Money for  
A (You) 













Allocation Your Decision 




$10 $0   Accept         Reject 
$9 $1   Accept         Reject 
$8 $2   Accept         Reject 
$7 $3   Accept         Reject 
$6 $4   Accept         Reject 
$5 $5   Accept         Reject 
$4 $6   Accept         Reject 
$3 $7   Accept         Reject 
$2 $8   Accept         Reject 
$1 $9   Accept         Reject 
$0 $10   Accept         Reject 
Player A 
 
Select how you wish to divide $10 
between you and Player B. 
 




Please indicate which 
offers you would be 
willing to accept by 
circling either Accept 





Please answer the following questions by circling the letter of the best response. If you would 
prefer not to answer any particular question, please leave it blank. 






2) What is your ethnicity? 
A) White 
B) Hispanic or Latino 
C) Black or African American 
D) Asian or Pacific Islander 
E) Native American or American Indian or Alaska Native 
F) Bi- or Multi-racial 
G) Other _________________ 
3) What is your gender? 
A) Male 
B) Female 
C) Transgender Male 
D) Transgender Female 
E) Other __________________ 






F) Other ___________________ 
5) What is the highest level of education you have attained? 
A) High School 
B) Trade/technical/vocational training 
C) Some college (currently enrolled, not yet complete) 
D) Bachelor’s Degree 
E) Graduate Degree 
6) How would you describe yourself politically? 
A) Liberal 
B) Somewhat liberal 
C) Moderate 






Blumberg, Rae Lesser. (1988), Income under Female versus Male Control: Hypotheses from a 
Theory of Gender Stratification and Data from the Third World. Journal of Family Issues, 
9:51–84. doi: 10.1177/019251388009001004 
Eckel, Catherine C. and Philip J Grossman. (1998), Are Women Less Selfish Than Men? 
Evidence from Dictator Experiments. The Economic Journal, 108: 726-735. doi: 
10.1111/1468-0297.00311 
Gummerson, E., & Schneider, D. (2013), Eat, drink, man, woman: Gender, income share and 
household expenditure in South Africa. Social Forces, 91(3), 813–836. doi: 
10.1093/sf/sos173 
Hoddinott, J. and Haddad, L. (1995), Does female income share influence household 
expenditures? Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
57: 77–96. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0084.1995.tb00028.x 
Kenney, C. T. (2008), Father Doesn’t Know Best? Parents’ Control of Money and Children’s 
Food Insecurity. Journal of Marriage and Family, 70: 654–669. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-
3737.2008.00512.x 
Nancy R. Buchan, Rachel T.A. Croson, Sara Solnick. (2008), Trust and gender: An examination 
of behavior and beliefs in the Investment Game. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, Volume 68, Issues 3–4, December 2008, Pages 466-476, ISSN 0167-2681, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.10.006 
Phipps, S. A. and Burton, P. S. (1998), What’s Mine is Yours? The Influence of Male and 
Female Incomes on Patterns of Household Expenditure. Economica, 65: 599–613. doi: 
10.1111/1468-0335.00148 
Saad, Gad and Tripat Gill. (2001), Sex Differences in the Ultimatum Game: An Evolutionary 
Psychology Perspective. Journal of Bioeconomics 3, no. 2: 171–193. doi: 
10.1023/A:1020583425623 
Solnick, S. (2001), Gender differences in the ultimatum game. Economic Inquiry, 39: 189–200. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00060.x 
Solnick, Sara, and Schweitzer, Maurice E. (1999), The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and 
Gender on Ultimatum Game Decisions, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, Volume 79, Issue 3, September 1999, Pages 199-215, ISSN 0749-5978, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1999.2843 
Zak PJ, Stanton AA, Ahmadi S (2007) Oxytocin Increases Generosity in Humans. PLoS ONE 
2(11): e1128. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0001128 
